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REVIEW ESSAY 

TOWARD A NOTION OF 

ENVIRONMENTAL BIOETHICS 

ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG* 
REVIEW OF ERIC A. DAVIDSON, You CAN'T EAT GNP: ECONOM­
ICS AS IF ECOLOGY MATTERED (2000) 
On November 7, 2000, while most people in the United States 
focused on the question of who our next President was going to be, 
lawyers for the American Trucking Associations and other industry 
groups argued to the Supreme Court that the Environmental Pro­
tection Agency ("EPA") should set the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards ("NAAQS") under the Clean Air Act through a 
cost-benefit analysis.1 The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set 
NAAQS-numeric limitations on the concentrations of various air 
pollutants, such as particulates or sulfur dioxide-at levels that 
"protect the public health" and "protect the public welfare from 
any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the pres­
ence of such air pollutant in the ambient air."2 Federal courts have 
upheld the EPA's authority to set NAAQS to ensure that human 
health is protected, even when the exact harms from a given pollu­
tant are uncertain.3 Nevertheless, on appeal before the Supreme 
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
J.D., 1996, Lewis & Clark School of Law; Ph.D., 1993, University of California; M.A., 
1986, The Johns Hopkins University. I would like to thank the Editorial Board of the 
Western New England Law Review for inviting me to submit this review essay. Com­
ments may be directed to me at rcraig@law.wnec.edu or through my web site, http:// 
www.wneclaw.wnec.edu/faculty/craigldefault.html. 
1. Linda Greenhouse, Attack on Clean Air Act Falters in High Court Arguments, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at A20. 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1994). 
3. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1151-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(rejecting an industry argument that the EPA can only protect against health effects 
that are clearly harmful or clearly adverse). 
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Court, industry lawyers argued that environmental regulation 
should be a matter of economics. 
The industry groups' arguments regarding NAAQS emphasize 
that the interaction of economics and environmental integrity is the 
focus of much of the debate over American environmental policy. 
Unfortunately, popular environmental policy discussion often inter­
prets concerns over ecological integrity as threats to human pros­
perity. In popular media, for example, news stories pose stark 
choices to the American people: do we want salmon or cheap 
power, spotted owls or a thriving timber industry, "surplus" tuna 
swimming in the sea or employed fishers, interfering governments 
or strong property rights? 
Such presentations are, of course, reductionist. Nevertheless, 
they highlight a disjunction that currently permeates much of the 
American debate over environmental policy-namely, that the 
question of how to value human welfare has come to be perceived 
as a different question from how to value an increasingly abstract 
concept of "the environment." Except during the occasional natu­
ral disaster, when the immediate connection between "the environ­
ment" and everyday human life cannot be ignored, Americans 
often have the luxury of viewing the natural ecosystems that sur­
round them as something "other," distinct and separate from 
human existence. We are a nation with many people who spend 
their lives largely insulated from any direct contact with the envi­
ronment: water comes from the tap, food comes from the supermar­
ket, sewage "disappears" down a pipe, garbage is hauled "away."4 
In its early stages, federal environmental law often benefited 
from headliner problems that made the need for better environ­
mental protections obvious, including cholera outbreaks from un­
treated sewage dumped into waterways, rivers so polluted that they 
could catch on fire, smog-filled airsheds that required frequent 
health alerts, and toxic soups of poorly-disposed chemicals bubbling 
up into homeowners' basements. In a culture where intimate and 
frequent contact with natural ecosystems is increasingly rare, how­
ever, the impetus for protecting the environment can quickly lose 
any sense of anthropocentric self-interest. Ironically, the fact that 
nearly three decades of environmental legislation has in fact re­
4. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 888 
(1997) ("The general ignorance of ecosystem services is partly the result of modern 
society's dissociation between computers, cars and clothing on the one hand and bi­
odiversity, nutrient cycling, and pollination on the other. "). 
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duced the frequency with which environmental problems impinge 
on Americans' daily lives has only served to further obscure the 
direct connections between humans and environmental protection. 
Environmentalism in the current American culture runs a real risk 
of becoming mere altruism-an impulse to protect the environment 
based on something other than a perception of direct benefit to the 
protector. 
Altruism may be a noble motivation, and there is merit to the 
idea that nature has its own intrinsic value quite apart from what we 
humans might do with it. Nevertheless, in the realm of politics and 
policy, self-interest is a much more reliable basis than altruism for 
any long-term commitment to sustaining a productive and healthy 
environment for generations to come. Self-interest can compel 
people to act in desired ways long after altruism becomes too ex­
pensive or inconvenient to maintain. 
Not all types of self-interest serve the goals of environmental 
protection, however. At the other end of the spectrum from altru­
ism, for instance, is the view that the environment is first, last, and 
foremost a source of raw materials and goods that create private 
wealth-food, minerals, timber, and so on. From this perspective, 
the environment is valuable because humans can directly, and often 
exploitatively, make use of it. Many such uses, moreover, are easily 
describable through neoclassic economic analyses of supply and de­
mand and market efficiency-the cutting and sale of timber, the 
catch and sale of fish, the mining and processing and sale of metals. 
The problem with this consumer view is that many aspects of 
the environment get left out of economic calculations and cost-ben­
efit analyses. The American Trucking Associations were well aware 
of this phenomenon when they suggested cost-benefit calculations 
as the solution to the NAAQS "problem." The problems that result 
from ready access to air or water for was.te disposal or from de­
nuded or mined lands have traditionally been externalities that no 
one had to pay for. 5 As a result, decisions that make perfect sense 
5. See Christine M. Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided by 
Natural Resources: Putting a Price on the "Priceless," 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 389 
(1993) ("[F]ailing to attach values to natural resources in a policy framework results in 
those resources being treated as though they have zero price, i.e., the resources are 
'valueless."'); see also Robert Costanza et aI., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Ser­
vices and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (1997) ("Because ecosystem services 
are not fully 'captured' in commercial markets or adequately quantified in terms com­
parable with economic services and manufactured capital, they are often given too little 
weight in policy decisions."); Salzman, supra note 4, at 888 ("The primary reason that 
ecosystem services are taken for granted, however, is that they are free .... [T]he ser­
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in the terms of pure neoclassical economics can leave air unbreath­
able, water undrinkable, and landscapes barren and poisoned. 
One of the more important developments in the economics of 
environmental protection has been the rise of ecological econom­
ics,6 a discipline that seeks to unify (or perhaps more accurately, re­
unify) the issues of valuing the environment and valuing the quality 
of human life. The key concept for ecological economics is ecosys­
tem services-those basic life-supporting services that the environ­
ment provides, such as "purification of air and water, pest control, 
renewal of soil fertility, climate regulation, pollination of crops and 
vegetation, and waste detoxification and decomposition."7 
By identifying and valuing ecosystem services, ecological eco­
nomics seeks to force people to recognize their intimate depen­
dency on the environment, including their dependency on distant 
ecosystems, and to factor that dependency into policy decisions re­
garding the environment. For example, in one of the more famous 
decisions based on recognizing the value to humans of ecosystem 
services, New York City chose to restore the ecological integrity of 
the Catskill Mountains in order to re-establish a pure supply of 
drinking water, rather than building a water purification plant. The 
city's reason for doing so was simple: it was cheaper ($660 million 
as opposed to $4 billion) to restore the mountain ecosystem than it 
was to build and maintain a technological substitute for the purifi­
cation services that an intact ecosystem could provide.8 
There are other indications that the economics of ecosystem 
services could be an effective catalyst in re-establishing environ­
mental protection as an intrinsically anthropocentric issue-that is, 
as not just a matter of saving whales or spotted owls or a few hun­
dred flies in southern California, but as the key to preserving our­
selves and future generations of human beings. In a controversial 
but influential 1997 study, a group of ecological economists esti­
vices underpinning [ecosystem] goods generally have no market value -not because 
they are worthless, but rather because there is no market to capture and express their 
value directly."). 
6. Ehsan Masood & Laura Garwin, Costing the Earth: When Ecology Meets Eco­
nomics, 395 NATURE 426, 426-27 (1998). 
7. Salzman, supra note 4, at 887-88; see also Costanza et aI., supra note 5, at 254 
(identifying seventeen ecosystem services, including: gas regulation, climate regulation, 
disturbance regulation, water regulation, water supply, erosion control and sediment 
retention, soil formation, nutrient cycling, waste treatment, pollination, biological con­
trol, refugia, food production, raw materials, genetic resources, recreation, and cultural 
services). 
8. Salzman, supra note 4, at 893-94. 
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mated that the value of the world's ecosystem services is approxi­
mately $33 trillion, or 1.8 times as large as the global GNP.9 
Environmental lawyers, moreover, have been quick to suggest that 
the concept of valued ecosystem services could bring profound 
changes in certain aspects of environmental law. Such changes 
could range from "influenc[ing] the process of natural resource 
damage assessment under CERCLA, the Oil Pollution Act, and 
similar federal and state laws" to reformation of "some existing le­
gal regimes [that] pose barriers" to using the ecosystem services 
concept, including "[w]ater rights, federal land multiple use man­
dates, below-cost timber sales, [and] tax and subsidy structures."10 
Against this background, Eric A. Davidson has submitted his 
own attempt to re-connect Americans to their environment, You 
Can't Eat GNP: Economics As If Ecology Mattered ("You Can't Eat 
GNP").!l His argument is clearly and openly stated early in the 
book: 
We may not need to think about tilling the fields every day, but 
we had better not lose sight of the fact that our wealth and our 
comfort are derived from a combination of natural resources­
soil, water, air, forests, oceans, mineral deposits, climate-and 
the skill and ingenuity with which we utilize and manage those 
resources. If we neglect or abuse those natural resources, we un­
dermine our own prosperity.12 
Davidson begins his exposition on this subject by identifying 
three fallacies of neoclassical economics: "Marie Antoinette eco­
nomics,"13 "Custer's folly,"l4 and "false complacency from partial 
success."15 The fallacy of Marie Antoinette economics arises when 
9. Costanza et aI., supra note 5, at 259. By changing some beginning assumptions, 
the researchers calculated the range of possible values for the world's ecosystem ser­
vices to be $16 to $54 trillion. Id. 
10. J. B. Ruhl, Valuing Nature's Services: The Future of Environmental Law, 13 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 359, 361 (1998); see also Salzman, supra note 4, at 898-903 
(outlining how the concept of ecosystem services could offer environmental law "speci­
ficity of indicators" that environmental harm has occurred, increasing potential causes 
of action; "specificity of causation" as to the source(s) of environmental harm, influenc­
ing environmental standing and Commerce Clause challenges; and a "persuasive argu­
ment that biodiversity and habitat protection provide important benefits in ways not 
normally considered"). 
11. ERIC A. DAVIDSON, You CAN'T EAT GNP: ECONOMICS AS IF ECOLOGY 
MATTERED (2000). 
12. Id. at 6. 
13. Id. at 7. 
14. Id. at 8. 
15. Id. at 11. 
178 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:173 
economists treat various segments of the GNP as interchangeable, 
like the economist who considered global warming an insignificant 
problem because it would affect only agriculture, which makes up a 
mere 3% of the nation's GNP.16 Davidson's point is that when 
crops fail, people go hungry, regardless of whether the other 97% 
of the GNP is unaffectedP And it probably won't be unaffected, 
because "the economic system will fail if the ecological system is 
not carefully managed. The inverse, which is also true, is that a 
failed economic systemccreates desperate people who will destroy 
the ecological system. "18 
The fallacy of Custer's folly is the belief that new and better 
technology, like the cavalry, will always save us from ecological dis­
aster.19 While Davidson welcomes any helpful technology that 
comes along, he also advises prudence and caution in our use of our 
environment: 
[W]e had best not rely solely on future technological develop­
ments to clean up the messes that we are now making with our 
current bad habits. Prudence dictates that we slow population 
growth, prevent soil erosion, conserve groundwater, and stop 
polluting the atmosphere. Future generations will benefit from 
these essential natural resources under any scenario of techno­
logical development.2o 
The fallacy of false complacency arises from the successes that 
environmental law has already secured, and Davidson's point is that 
some progress in cleaning up our air and water should not prompt 
us to think that we have taken care of our environmental problems: 
A bit of progress is no reason for complacency in a world where 
forests are being converted to ranches, farms, and abandoned 
land at an astounding rate, where the genetic diversity of plants 
and animals is declining and species are going extinct at unprece­
dented speed, where fisheries are collapsing, where soil is erod­
ing faster than it can be regenerated, where heat-trapping gases 
are accumulating in the atmosphere, and where groundwater is 
becoming depleted and contaminated.21 
As the title of Davidson's book indicates, he is interested in 
16. Id. at 7. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 8. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 9. 
21. Id. at 11. 
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food, or, more broadly, basic survival. His view of ecological eco­
nomics, therefore, appropriately starts with the soil. Farming 
throughout the world, as Davidson describes it, has long been a 
process of exposing and depleting fertile topsoils, then abandoning 
those lands for new ones, leaving the used-up soils to erode under 
the forces of water and wind.22 Davidson focuses on cotton farm­
ing, a notoriously soil~destructive crop,23 but the reader can also 
recall the Great Dust Bowl of the 1930s to support Davidson's pic­
ture. Davidson then contrasts the neoclassical economist's and the 
ecologist's views of such farming practices: 
Economists would argue that these farmers were acting rationally 
in terms of doing what provided them the greatest profit for their 
investments of capital and labor. Ecologists, on the other hand, 
see a sad, irrational legacy of abuse of the land by previous gen­
erations, which limits the potential use of the land today and for 
several generations to come.24 
Indeed, Davidson stresses, humans' continued survival at present 
population levels has depended heavily on technological advances 
in agriculture, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides, rather 
than on our stewardship of naturally fertile soils.25 But we must 
resist the temptation to take good soils for granted and to fall into 
Custer's folly regarding further technological advances, because: 
Soil is more than dirt. It is a complex mixture of minerals and 
organic matter that can provide a rich medium for abundant 
plant growth. It takes a long time, however, for Mother Nature 
to make good, fertile topsoil. Dead leaves and roots are gradu­
ally mixed with the clay minerals by the activity of worms, mites, 
bacteria, and other organisms living in the soil. This mixture has 
the right combination of nutrients, aeration, and water-holding 
properties to nourish the plants. When the topsoil is eroded 
away, exposing the deeper subsoil layers that have not developed 
this rich mixture of organic matter with minerals, abundant plant 
growth cannot be supported. Depending on the climate and the 
type of vegetation, the formation of an inch of new topsoil can 
require anywhere from fifty years to several hundred years.26 
A number of Davidson's more general themes emerge as he 
discusses soil. First, Davidson stresses throughout his arguments 
22. [d. at 16. 
23. [d. at 15-17. 
24. [d. at 17. 
25. [d. at 18. 
26. [d. at 23-24. 
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that when humans use environmental natural capital without an 
ecological perspective, they often cause other environmental 
problems that are far more difficult and expensive to solve.27 For 
example, the chemical fertilizers and pesticides that preserve and 
enhance soil productivity pollute surface and groundwater.28 Nev­
ertheless, under neoclassical economics, the farmer's decision to ap­
ply excess fertilizers and pesticides to crops makes perfect sense 
even though the farmer knows that some will be washed away, be­
cause the cost of polluting the water is an externality for which the 
farmer pays nothing.29 
But what about the Clean Water Act?,3° the reader may won­
der. While it is true that environmental regulation can force pol­
luters to think about externalities that would otherwise be "free" 
and force them, in some sense, to "pay" for their pollution through 
permit requirements and fees, Davidson's farming example is a par­
ticularly apt choice to demonstrate the gaps in current American 
environmental law. Farmers enjoy several exemptions from envi­
ronmental mandates that might otherwise force them to take ac­
count of the costs of pollution.31 For example, farmers are not 
forced to comply with the federal Clean Water Act's general re­
quirement that persons discharging pollutants into waterways have 
a permit.32 Rather than being regulated, therefore: 
The fertilizer that makes crops grow better while still on the 
farmer's field also makes unwanted algae grow better in streams 
and lakes, which chokes out the native aquatic plants, depletes 
oxygen in the water that the fish need, and destroys the natural 
food chain. Some of the fertilizer and pesticide also make their 
way into the groundwater, which is out of sight but a vital source 
of drinking water and irrigation water in many regions of the 
world.33 
As a result, the local problem of how one farmer grows the largest 
27. Id. at 121-24. 
28. Id. at 124-29. 
29. See id. at 122. 
30. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376 
(1994). 
31. For a discussion of the numerous exemptions from environmental regulation 
that farms and farmers enjoy, see generally J. B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental 
Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 293-327 (2000). 
32. See 33 U.S.c. § 1311(a) (making it illegal for any person to discharge a pollu­
tant into a navigable water except in compliance with the federal Clean Water Act); 
§ 1342(e)(I) (allowing an exception for the discharge of agricultural pollutants). 
33. DAVIDSON, supra note 11, at 122-23. 
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crop possible becomes a regional problem of water pollution, and, 
as Davidson points out, "[l]ocal problems are almost always easier 
to solve than are regional ones."34 Groundwater in particular can 
take several hundred or even thousands of years to flush out and 
recharge naturally.35 
The lengths of time involved in soil regeneration and ground­
water replenishment underscore Davidson's second theme: a long­
term, multi-generational view of ecology and economics that de­
fines "success" not by quarterly or yearly profits but by the sus­
tainability of ecosystem services and the quality of the planet left to 
the next several generations of humans. Davidson criticizes short­
term thinking throughout his analysis, while still recognizing that 
most people can and will yield to the temptation to ignore the needs 
of future generations. Thus, "we know that protecting natural re­
sources for the benefit of future generations is the right thing to do, 
but we often yield to the temptation of ignoring the well-being of 
future generations for the sake of more consumption in the short­
term."36 This regard for future generations is a hallmark of ecologi­
cal economics, which "aims to provide a framework for the equita­
ble distribution of resources and property rights within the present 
generation of humans, between current and future generations and 
between humans and other species."37 
The structure of this framework, and the related criticism of 
current economics, policy, and law, is the third and most important 
theme in You Can't Eat GNP. In the case of soils, for example, 
Davidson recognizes that: 
The problem is not that we are dumb-we understand why the 
soil becomes degraded and how to avoid it-but that collectively 
we are forgetful, some of us are greedy, and some are desperate. 
And there is no shortage of inept managers and policymakers 
ready to condone and implement practices based on greed and 
desperation.38 
He criticizes current policies, such as subsidies for irrigation water, 
that encourage environmentally-damaging practices, and lauds 
those, like the Conservation Reserve Program, which encourages 
farmers to conserve easily-erodible land, that encourage long-term 
34. [d. at 123. 
35. [d. at 125. 
36. [d. at 69. 
37. Masood & Garwin, supra note 6, at 427. 
38. DAVIDSON, supra note 11, at 31. 
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ecological sustain ability. Nevertheless, Davidson has a much larger 
goal in mind than retooling individual regulatory programs. He 
wants "an economic system that is designed to value the future at 
least as much as the present. "39 
You Can't Eat GNP pursues this ultimate goal in primarily two 
ways: (1) by attacking cost-benefit analyses as they are currently 
performed in environmental law and policy; and (2) by suggesting 
steps that Americans can take to implement sustainable policies of 
ecological economics. Davidson devotes two of his nine chapters to 
cost-benefit analyses, emphasizing that "many of the benefits of en­
vironmental protection are left out of the balance sheet entirely be­
cause they are too difficult or impossible to calculate by standard 
neoclassical economics."40 In particular, Davidson highlights two 
problems with cost-benefit analyses based on principles from neo­
classical economics: valuation at the margin and discounting to pre­
sent value. 
Marginal valuation relies on the prices for limited numbers of 
goods or services traded on the open market in accordance with the 
law of supply and demand. As a result, it both fractionalizes the 
potential value of functional ecosystems and ignores those services 
for which ready markets do not exist. Marginal valuation thus re­
sults in cost-benefit analyses that do not fully account for the value 
in leaving ecosystems intact and undamaged, creating a bias toward 
using and exploiting the environment. By increasing the value 
placed on intact ecosystems, the concept of ecosystem services 
could, Davidson admits, legitimize some cost-benefit analyses for 
environmental decision-making, "as long as the inadequacies of the 
monetary estimates of ecosystem services are recognized. "41 When 
policymakers recognize that ecosystem services exist and have mon­
etary value, they should be less likely to favor choices that impair 
those ecosystems. 
Nevertheless, even ecosystem services suffer from pricing at 
the margin, and "[t]he value to humanity of the many products and 
services provided by [the environment] may be greater than the 
sum of the many small parts calculated at the margin. "42 As a re­
sult, Davidson remains skeptical of environmental cost-benefit 
analyses, even if ecosystem services become a standard part of the 
39. [d. at 77. 
40. [d. at 39. 
41. /d. at 48. 
42. [d. at 56. 
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balancing equation. "The right prices for ecosystem services, and 
the marginal valuation method upon which these are based, are 
useful tools for many inevitable decisions about trade-offs, but they 
may be inadequate to conserve the natural resources that we will 
need at large scales for long-term economic and ecological prosper­
ity."43 Instead, our economic and political systems have to recog­
nize and account for the fact that certain resources such as "soil, 
fresh water, air, forests, and oceans ... are essential, irreplaceable, 
and nonsubstitutable"44-"that the economic system cannot exist 
without the ecological system."45 
If valuation at the margin undervalues intact ecosystems and 
natural capital, then discounting in cost-benefit analyses favors pre­
sent use over long-term sustainability. Discounting is the process of 
calculating the present value of an economic decision, allowing 
ready comparison of various options. In Davidson's example, a log­
ging company might be deciding whether to cut a stand of timber 
this year or wait until next year. This year, the trees are worth 
$1000, which the company could then invest for a year and earn 8% 
interest, giving the company a total profit a year from now of $1080. 
Alternatively, the company could wait a year to cut the trees, which 
would then be worth $1050 because they were slightly bigger. The 
company would, however, have lost out on the interest for a year, 
and thus the trees are actually worth more if cut now rather than 
later. Discounting to present value, again assuming an 8% return 
rate, the timber is worth $1000 now if cut and $969 now if left 
standing. 
So far, this is all standard economics. Davidson, however, chal­
lenges the whole notion of discounting, arguing that "[a]ny parent 
or grandparent knows that there is something wrong with this no­
tion that the future is worth less than the present. "46 What dis­
counting ignores is the interim and future value of the intact 
ecosystem. For instance, in the timber example, discounting com­
pletely leaves out the value of having standing trees and the ser­
vices they provide (erosion control, gas exchange, root habitat) for 
an additional year, plus the value of still having the option to cut or 
not cut a year from now. While Davidson acknowledges that one 
problem may be the choice of discount rate-lower discount rates 
43. [d. at 58. 
44. [d. at 55. 
45. [d. at 59. 
46. [d. at 68. 
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tend to encourage people to leave the environment intact, while 
higher discount rates encourage immediate use and exploitation­
he more strongly argues that the present generation needs to act 
according to the precautionary principle. That is, the current gener­
ation needs to be willing to accept the current costs of environmen­
tal protection to shield their children and grandchildren from 
higher costs and, perhaps, irreversible destruction. By doing noth­
ing now, we are in fact choosing to risk imposing the future costs of 
"soil erosion, global warming, groundwater pollution, and vast de­
struction of forest habitat"47 on future generations, betting their fu­
ture on the hope that some unknown and uninvented something 
will come along that makes solving those environmental problems 
cheaper and easier. In other words, we are falling victim to Custer's 
folly and forcing others to pay for it. 
Davidson also points out that we are ignoring the fact that 
leaving intact and functional ecosystems to future generations also 
has value, both economic and moral: 
Instead of starting with a vision of the world we want to leave to 
future generations and then allowing economics to help us find 
the most efficient way to achieve that goal, we are letting the 
economic tail wag the dog by misusing the tools of economics to 
define the goals.48 
Neoclassical economic theory cannot make the social and moral de­
cisions regarding the proper distribution of wealth and property 
within the existing generation nor among the generations, and 
"[w]e should not expect neoclassical economic theory to tell us how 
much of our natural resource wealth we should leave intact for the 
use of future generations."49 Davidson offers no magic solution, 
however, except a vision of the decision-making process: "[w]e 
must weave together our instinctive parental precaution with trans­
parent economic analyses as we make decisions that affect the envi­
ronmental inheritance passed on to the next generation."50 
Davidson does, however, offer a series of practical steps for 
both governments (the top-down approach) and individuals (the 
bottom-up approach) to take to begin to achieve his vision of eco­
logical economics. Somewhat surprisingly, given his topic, popula­
tion growth and population control become real topics only in the 
47. Id. at 74. 
48. Id. 
49. ld. at 76. 
50. ld. at 79. 
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last chapter, when Davidson suddenly reveals them to be the foun­
dation of his structure of environmental economics. In particular, 
Davidson advocates not filling the planet to capacity with human 
beings: 
[H]ow many people the earth can support is the wrong question 
to be asking. Rather, we should be asking if we already have 
enough people and perhaps too many people. If the neoclassical 
economic model is right-that each additional person is a valua­
ble worker, consumer, contributor to the GNP, and stimulator of 
innovative technologies that can substitute for all natural re­
sources-then we have nothing to worry about as the population 
grows. If the second law of technodynamics is correct-that the 
increasingly difficult challenges of consuming nonsubstitutable 
resources, providing food, and disposing of garbage for a rapidly 
expanding population leaves us and future generations with 
fewer options and more problems to resolve-then we already 
have too many people on the earth.51 
One of Davidson's eight "top-down" recommendations, there­
fore, is that countries with income taxes should eliminate tax deduc­
tions for more than two children.52 He also recommends that 
countries should stop building new roads, because "[t]ruly sustaina­
ble development that will bring large numbers of people out of pov­
erty will require intelligent intensification of agricultural and 
industrial productivity in the areas already accessible by existing 
roads."53 In addition, Davidson suggests that taxes on income be 
reduced while taxes on consumption are increased; that govern­
ments eliminate subsidies that encourage wasteful and destructive 
use of water and public lands; that farmers be encouraged to make 
more efficient use of their land, to prevent soil erosion, and to mini­
mize use of fertilizers and pesticides; and that governments elimi­
nate subsidies for industrial fishing.54 Finally, he recommends that 
countries ratify the Kyoto Agreement to reduce greenhouse emis­
sions, and that countries negotiate international agreements to 
maintain forest cover and to manage forests "to maximize genetic 
diversity of plants and animals."55 
Davidson's "bottom-up" recommendations stress personal re­
sponsibility for the environment and the policy decisions that are 
51. [d. at 188. 
52. [d. at 198. 
53. /d. at 197-98. 
54. [d. at 198-200. 
55. [d. at 200. 
186 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:173 
made regarding its use. He suggests, for example, that readers edu­
cate others by lending You Can't Eat GNP to persons who would 
not otherwise read it56 and by en~uring that their legislators under­
stand the importance and value of intact ecosystems. Davidson also 
encourages readers to analyze and change their own consumption 
habits and to work toward changing "the way our society currently 
values and uses our resources."57 
In the end, however, Davidson is content with making a mod­
est beginning in changing his readers' perceptions of their connec­
tion to the environment. Despite his potentially revolutionary goal 
of a whole new economic structure, he admits in the end that 
"[c]hanging a way of thinking as deeply entrenched as neoclassical 
economics appears daunting, and I cannot put my finger on exactly 
how it will come about. Persistent, pervasive, and popular pressure 
will surely be a part of it."58 The law, too, could certainly have a 
role. Davidson recognizes this most clearly in his "top-down" rec­
ommendations, many of which, such as the elimination of various 
government subsidies and various tax reforms, could have profound 
ramifications for American environmental policy and politics. 
Davidson, however, is a scientist, not a lawyer, and his book 
leaves largely unexplored the full and creative potential for law to 
help bring about the "sea change" in thought that he seeks. In par­
ticular, Davidson's goals for ecological economics cry out for laws 
and policies that make humans' connections to their environment 
protectable and enforceable. Other writers have already suggested 
the concept of an "eco-tort" as one means of incorporating the con­
cept of ecosystem services into environmental law. Such sugges­
tions, however, often begin with an expanded concept of private 
property-as J. B. Ruhl has described it, "a new form of tort, an 
eco-tort, to capture damage to one's ecosystem serVIce 
ownership."59 
Another form of eco-tort is possible, however-one rooted in a 
bioethical conception of personal integrity and autonomy rather 
than in property rights. In medicine, the law has effectively pro­
tected the integrity and personal autonomy of patients through doc­
trines such as informed consent, the patient's right to refuse 
treatment, and physician nonmalfeasance. Moreover, the law of 
56. Id. at 202. 
57. Id. at 209.. 
58. Id. at 216. 
59. Ruhl, supra note 10, at 361 (emphasis added). 
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medical bioethics has accomplished such protection while operating 
under two serious constraints. First, American law is unwilling (in­
deed, is constitutionally unable) to recognize a property right in a 
person's own body. Basic property rights, after all, almost always 
include the right to sell, transfer, damage, and destroy the property 
involved. If applied to human beings, these rights would legalize 
slavery and murder. Second, principles of medical bioethics also 
recognize, implicitly and explicitly, that one person's rights of au­
tonomy and self-integrity are limited: (1) by other individuals' 
claims to similar rights, demonstrated most graphically through the 
ongoing debates regarding the status of a fetus and the recognition 
of the so-called maternal-fetal conflict; (2) by certain kinds of medi­
cal necessity, as when doctors treat unconscious or otherwise in­
competent patients; (3) by generally-accepted norms of medical 
ethics, as the strong resistance to legalized euthanasia and physi­
cian-assisted suicide continue to emphasize; and (4) by the needs of 
the greater community, as when involuntary quarantine becomes a 
legitimate infringement of individual autonomy during outbreaks of 
highly communicable diseases. 
What if the concepts of personal integrity and autonomy were 
expanded to include those ecosystem services upon which a per­
son's life depends? If the ultimate environmental goal is, as David­
son argues, to recognize humanity's intimate dependence on intact 
and sustainable ecosystems and to create political and economic 
systems that strongly value protecting those ecosystems and their 
services through mUltiple generations, then a non-property-based 
legal regime offers environmental law the same balanced advan­
tages that it does to medical bioethics. Ecological integrity can be 
legally protected without converting ecosystem services into pri­
vately-owned, and therefore transferable and destructible, com­
modities. Environmental bioethics would thus protect the 
environment without giving individuals the power to interfere with 
other individuals' and the larger community's dependence on, and 
rights regarding, those same ecosystems. In addition, a legal regime 
of environmental bioethics would rescue the concept of human con­
nectedness to the environment from the quasi-religious overtones it 
acquired in the 1960s and 1970s, stressing that environmental dam­
age is about real human injury and real human survival, not some 
mystical "oneness with the universe." 
Eco-torts based on a notion of environmental bioethics would, 
in effect, recognize an expanded concept of legal "personhood," 
one that includes the environmental systems necessary to support a 
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human life. As such, bioethical eco-torts are a fairly radical legal 
concept, and implementing them would require courts and legisla­
tures to accept a very different definition of what it means to be a 
human being than that which currently exists in the law. Neverthe­
less, it is worth noting that tort law already does extend personal 
injury beyond the bounds of a person's own skin, as in wrongful 
death and loss of consortium claims. Moreover, as a practical mat­
ter, most eco-torts would probably result in class-action litigation, 
because the chances are great that ecosystem damage, unlike medi­
cal decisions, would affect far more than one person at a time. Fi­
nally, bioethical eco-torts would probably also require courts and 
legislatures to adjust standard legal principles of standing (strongly 
implying that bioethical eco-torts should be state law causes of ac­
tion, not federal) and causation. 
On the other hand, if the goal truly is to bring about a "sea 
change" in Americans' conception of the environment, to convince 
them that intact ecosystems and ecosystem services have sufficient 
value to counter the short-term profits from exploitative and unsus­
tainable use, we could do worse than creating a new legal cause of 
action that forces people to conceptualize the environment as part 
of themselves instead of something "other." The existence of 
bioethical eco-torts would encourage every individual to learn 
about and keep watch over the environmental processes upon 
which that individual's quality of life depends, whether those 
processes be the water purification processes in the Catskill water­
shed or the natural soil regeneration processes that created this 
country's farmlands. The identification of environmental damage 
with personal injury rather than property damage could thus effec­
tively repair the disjunction between the value we place on the eco­
nomic quality of human life and the value we place (or don't place) 
on "the environment" in the abstract. 
What Davidson and ecological economists really seek to teach 
us, as I have presented them, is that we are intimately, personally, 
and directly dependent on our environment and the life-sustaining 
services it provides. But if the popular conception of the environ­
ment is going to change, people need a pro-ecosystem mental image 
strong enough to withstand the repeated assaults of personal desire 
and greed. A legally-enforceable notion of environmental bioethics 
that recognized our absolute dependence on intact and functional 
ecosystems could not only legally protect ecosystems and their ser­
vices but also re-figure our short-sighted GNP-producing con­
sumerism into a morally repugnant, and legally expensive, 
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environmental cannibalism. After all, the point is not so much that 
we cannnot eat GNP, but rather that we should not eat ourselves­
or our children. 
